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For m any  C a n ad ian s , the  Som alia  Affair becam e a symbol of their arm ed forces in 
the 1990s. In tense m edia coverage of a Som ali 
teen ’s m urder by C anad ian  para troopers, its 
cover-up by sen ior b u rea u c ra ts  an d  officers a t 
N ational Defence H eadquarte rs  an d  a  series of 
su b seq u e n t scan d a ls  shook public confidence 
in  the n a tio n ’s m ilitary in stitu tions. Negative 
coverage particularly in the first half of the 1990s 
created  an  image of m ilitary incom petence and  
unprofessionalism , vividly captured  in letters to 
th e  ed ito r to m ajo r n ew sp ap e rs  a c ro ss  the 
country. In recent years th a t image was balanced 
w ith m ore positive ones of C anad ian  Forces 
personnel pro tecting  the peace in  the  Form er 
Yugoslavia, Africa, and  E ast Timor. Nevertheless, 
the  spectre  of Som alia still lingers in the m inds 
of m any both  in an d  ou t of uniform .
The s tro n g  p re se n c e  of S om alia  in  the  
na tiona l collective m em ory is p e rh ap s partly  a 
resu lt of the Report of the Commission of Inquiry 
into the C anad ian  deploym ent to E a s t Africa, 
revealing ly  titled  D ishonoured  Legacy: The  
L essons o f the Som alia Affair. This report is 
one of th e  few p u b lic ly  a ccess ib le , q u a s i­
sch o la rly  a c c o u n ts  of a C a n a d ia n  m ilita ry  
operation  in the  la s t decade w hich is b ased  on 
an  allegedly full appreciation of prim ary sources. 
Essentially, the report rep resen ts  a  first draft of 
C anad ian  m ilitary h istory  since the  end of the 
Cold War.
Com posed by a  com m ission of two ju ris ts  
and  a senior journalist, the report lent credibility 
to public perceptions th a t the C anad ian  Forces 
in the 1990s were deficient an d  in danger of 
co llap se . The c o m m iss io n ers  c la im ed  th a t  
du ring  O peration Deliverance (the m ission  to
S o m a lia )  “s y s te m s  b ro k e  d o w n  a n d  
organizational discipline crum bled” w ith in  the 
C a n a d ia n  A irborne  B a ttle g ro u p , a n d  th a t  
“planning, training, and  overall preparations fell 
far sh o rt of w hat w as required....W e can  only 
hope th a t Som alia rep resen ts  the n ad ir of the 
fo rtunes of the C anad ian  Forces. There seem s 
to be little room  to slide lower.”1 The report 
im plies th a t C an ad a’s m ilitary personnel were 
p o o rly  t r a in e d , in c o m p e te n tly  led , b a d ly  
equipped, and  quite often racist. Dishonoured  
Legacy  is especially influential as an  historical 
text since it p a sses  criticism  of the  Som alia 
operation to all of C anada’s military institu tions 
based  on an  adm ittedly incomplete investigation 
of crim inal activity an d  cover-up du ring  the 
m is s io n  of one  b a t t le g ro u p  on a fo re ig n  
deployment.
In fact, O peration Deliverance w as only one 
of dozens of m issions carried  ou t by C anad ian  
soldiers, sailors, an d  aircrew  during  the  p as t 
decade . Before accep ting  the  co m m issio n ’s 
c o n d e m n a tio n  of th e  p ro fe ss io n a lism  a n d  
leadersh ip  of the arm ed forces, and  of the arm y 
in particu lar, it would be useful to scrutin ize 
o ther m ilitary activity during  the sam e period. 
The B alkans are a good place to s ta rt. Indeed, 
C anad ian  experience in the  Form er Yugoslavia 
is m ore represen ta tive  of the n a tio n ’s m ilitary 
experience in the 1990s th an  the ra ther u nusua l 
case of Som alia.
Since 1992, ten s of th o u san d s  of C anadian  
m ilitary and  naval personnel have endeavoured 
to restore peace to the Balkans. They have acted 
as peacekeepers, negotiators, aid  w orkers, and 
q u i te  o f te n  a s  c o m b a t  s o ld ie r s .  I n i t ia l  
exam ination of a n um ber of C anadian  m issions
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to the region in 1992-94, including those a t 
Sarajevo, S rebrn ica, an d  the M edak Pocket, 
seem  to contrast w ith the Somalia Com m ission’s 
findings abou t poor leadersh ip  an d  training. 
W hat follows is a closer investigation of Canadian 
e f fo r ts  to  im p le m e n t  th e  M e d ak  P o c k e t 
Agreem ent in 1993 to determ ine if the n a tio n ’s 
arm ed forces were tru ly  a t their “n a d ir” during  
the fateful year of the Som alia scandal.
In m id -S ep tem ber 1993 U nited  N ations 
Protection Force (UNPROFOR) soldiers from 2nd 
B attalion, P rincess P atric ia’s C anad ian  Light 
Infan try  (2 PPCLI) advanced  into the d ispu ted  
M edak Pocket in so u th e rn  C roatian w ith orders 
to im p lem en t the  la te s t cease-fire  be tw een  
C roatian Army troops and  Serb irregular forces. 
2 PPCLI were reinforced w ith two m echanized 
com panies of F rench  troops. The C anad ians, 
w ell s c h o o le d  in  th e  d e l ic a te  a r t  of 
“peacekeep ing”, discovered the ir negotiation  
s k i l l s  a n d  s t r i c t  im p a r t ia l i ty  w e re  n o t 
immediately required the Medak Pocket. Instead 
they found themselves calling upon their primary 
w ar-fighting skills w hen C roatian  Army u n its  
opened fire w ith m ach ine-guns, m orta rs  and  
a rtille ry  in  a n  effort to s top  th e  C a n a d ian  
advance. To complete their assigned m ission the 
P atric ia’s wTere requ ired  to th rea ten  the u se  of, 
and ultimately use, deadly force against Croatian 
u n i ts .  H ow ever, th e  t ru e  te s t  of m ilita ry  
professionalism  and  discipline cam e after the 
sm oke cleared, the C roatians backed  down and 
the C anadians immediately reverted to their role 
as im partial peacekeepers in their dealings with 
in d iv id u a ls  w ho only m o m en ts  before h a d  
a ttem pted  to kill them .
Resolute C anadian  and  French action came 
a t a time w hen the UN reputation in Croatia was 
a t a low ebb due to repeated  failures to secure 
the  infam ous United Nations Protected  Areas 
(UNPAs). Colonel George Oehring, com m ander 
of UNPROFOR S e c to r  S o u th , c la im ed  the  
P rincess P atrc ia’s “won for the whole m ission a 
c re d ib ility  a n d  r e s p e c t  th a t  w ill be  long  
rem em bered by the opposing parties and  m uch 
facilitate our fu tu re  efforts h e re .”2 For their 
efforts, 2 PPCLI w as aw arded a U nited Nations 
F o rce  C o m m a n d e r’s C o m m e n d a tio n  from  
F rench  G eneral Cot, the first of its k ind  of one 
of only three aw arded in UNPROFOR’s history.
Of course, the C anad ians originally w ent to 
the  Form er Republic of Yugoslavia to pro tect a
fragile truce, no t to im pose peace on w arring 
factions locked in a bloody civil war. Until the 
early 1990s Yugoslavia w as a federation of six 
republics including Croatia, Serbia, Montenegro, 
Slovenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia, all 
qu ite  sim ilar in  language, cu ltu re  an d  custom . 
D e sp ite  th e  p re s e n c e  of u l t r a -n a t io n a l i s t  
m ovem en ts in  each  repub lic , th e  Yugoslav 
fe d e ra tio n  e x is te d  h a rm o n io u s ly  e a rn in g  
international acclaim and  the privilege of hosting 
the world a t the  1984 W inter Olympics.
The co llapse  of c e n tra lize d  co m m u n is t 
au tho rity  in Yugoslavia during  the late  1980s 
b ro u g h t n a tio n a lis ts  in  each  rep u b lic  in to  
m a in s tre a m  p o litic s . In  S e rb ia , S lo b o d a n  
Milosevic and  in  C roatia  Franjo Tudjm an, rose 
to power by destroying the carefully constructed 
Yugoslav identity in  favour of a new nationhood 
b ased  on blood and  religion. In the  process, 
S erb ia , m ost pow erful of the  six  repub lics, 
a ttem p ted  to take control over the crum bling 
fed era tio n . T his did n o t appeal to growing 
na tiona lis t m ovem ents in  Croatia an d  Slovenia 
resu lting  in  declara tions of independence in 
1991, followed closely by a sim ilar move in 
B osnia. C roatia  an d  B osnia con ta ined  large 
n u m b ers  of e thnic  Serbs, hostile to the federal 
b r e a k u p .  C r o a t ia n  a n d  B o s n ia n  S e rb s  
estab lished  param ilita ry  forces to res is t their 
respective  new  governm en ts lead ing  to two 
distinctly  separa te  civil wars.
D uring  the opening m on ths of these  w ars, 
the  Yugoslav N ational Army (JNA), on orders 
from Belgrade, openly intervened to prevent the 
b rea k u p  of the  federation. JNA involvem ent 
usually  m eant assisting  Serb m ilitias in Croatia 
an d  Bosnia. However, the  regular arm y w as a 
m irror of the old federation an d  th u s  suffered 
from the sam e problem s of divided loyalties. 
Non-Serb officers and  senior NCOs left the JNA 
to jo in  the new national arm ies of the ir hom e 
republics. This exodus of non-S erbs destroyed 
cohesion in the  JNA, th u s  elim inating the only 
m odern professional military force in Yugoslavia. 
With no arm y left to im plem ent its goals and  an 
econom y on  th e  verge of co llap se , S e rb ia  
gradually withdrew from conflicts in Croatia and 
Bosnia, leaving Serb m inorities there  to fend for 
them selves aga in st the  newly created  B osnian 
an d  C roatian  arm ies. Serb m ilitias acquired  
weapons, vehicles, and  even volunteers from the 
JNA as it withdrew, while newly created Croatian 
an d  B osnian forces received equipm ent from
outside sou rces like G erm any and  the  United 
States. However, equipm ent alone does not build 
an  arm y. It would take years before the  various 
m ilitias an d  arm ed gangs would coalesce into 
professional m ilitary forces.
For m ost of the period betw een 1992-95, the 
Yugoslav w ars of succession  were w aged by 
am ateurs. W hen the JNA was removed from the 
equation, they took with them  the norm al codes 
of conduct held by m odern professional m ilitary 
officers. Rival m ilitias fired w eapons in  the  
vicinity of opposing troops, more often th an  not, 
in ten t on killing civilians. The resu lt w as to 
c rea te  a p a tte rn  of co m b a t w here m ilita ry  
casualties were few. The new  arm ies knew  how 
to kill, b u t no t how to wage w ar against o ther 
soldiers properly. U nprotected  civilians were a 
different m atter. And so, the objective in  these 
w ars w as no t to defeat the  opponen t’s com bat 
power b u t to consolidate new  ethnic n a tio n ­
s ta te s  by killing or driving ou t those who did 
not fit.3
T he U n ite d  N a tio n s  P ro te c t io n  F o rce  
(UNPROFOR) en tered  th is  sto rm  in 1992, first 
in C roatia  an d  la ter in  Bosnia. In Croatia, the 
UN b ro k ered  a cease-fire  betw een  the  new
A  r iflem a n fro m  the  2 n d  B a tta lio n , P rincess Patricia's  
C a n a d ia n  L ight In fan try  n ea r M edak , equ ipped  w ith  
the C-7 au tom a tic  rifle.
C roatian  governm ent in  Zagreb and  m inority 
Serbs who sough t independence from the new 
s ta t e .  T h e  p e a c e  a g re e m e n t  in c lu d e d  
es tab lishm en t of a UN patrolled  buffer zone in 
u n d e r C h ap te r VI of the  UN C harte r.4 B oth 
parties  welcomed the  cease fire, w hen in fact it 
held, as a n  opportun ity  to build  their m ilitary 
capabilities un til su ch  tim e as victory could be 
assu red . This was the environm ent faced by 
C an ad ian  so ld iers m ak ing  up  UNPROFOR’s 
C anadian  B attalion N um ber 1 in  1993.
The second rotation of CANBAT 1 was based 
on the “regu lar force” 2nd B attalion of Princess 
Patric ia’s C anad ian  Light Infantry. However, of 
the 875 soldiers m aking up  the battlegroup, only 
375 actually  cam e from th a t unit. One hun d red  
and sixty five came from other regular force units 
and  assignm en ts. The rem ainder consisted  of 
385 reserve soldiers who had  volunteered from 
m ilitia u n its  across the  C anada. Due to the 
requ irem ent for highly skilled and  experienced 
regular soldiers in su p p o rt an d  technical trade  
positions w ithin the battlegroup and  the overall 
sho rtage  of com bat in fan try  so ld iers in  the  
C anadian Army, the m ajority of those reservists 
served in  the rifle com panies. In fact, reserve 
soldiers m ade up  70 p ercen t of rifle com pany 
strength during the mission. This includes seven 
ou t of the  12 platoon com m anders who cam e 
from militia battalions as Reserve Entry Scheme 
Officers (RESO).5
Reserve augm en tation  w as no t new  in the 
C anad ian  Army. For decades, u n d e r-s tren g th  
regular battalions had  their ranks filled out with 
reserv ists before deploying to Cyprus. Indeed, 
after m uch  debate  in the  C anad ian  defence 
community, providing regular un it augm entation 
w ith individual soldiers becam e a p rim ary  role 
fo r r e s e r v e  r e g im e n ts  in  th e  1 9 9 0 s . 
A ugm entation w as particu larly  vital during  the 
tim e of im m ed ia te  p o s t-C o ld  W ar conflic t 
p ro life ration , a co rresp o n d in g  sp ike in  the  
num ber and  intensity  of peacekeeping m issions 
com bined w ith sh rink ing  personnel pools and  
budgets. This was especially true  in 1993 w hen 
the army, now known as Land Forces Command, 
w as s t r e tc h e d  n e a r ly  b e y o n d  its  m e a n s ; 
p ro v id ing  two b a tt le g ro u p s  to  the  F o rm er 
Yugoslavia (the o ther in Bosnia), one to Som alia 
and  a  n u m b er of o ther un its , de tachm en ts and
L ieu tenant-C olonel J a m e s  Calvin, co m m a n d er o j  the  
2 PPCLI B attlegroup
ind iv idual so ld iers to a m yriad  of m issions 
a ro u n d  the world. N evertheless the 2 PPCLI 
B attlegroup in C roatia  contained  the h ighest 
c o n c e n t r a t io n  of re s e rv e  s o ld ie rs  on  a n  
operational m ission  to date. The s ta n d a rd  of 
M ilitia perform ance in a tense  an d  dem anding 
th ea tre  like Croatia, rem ained to be seen.
The 2 PPCLI Battlegroup spent the first three 
m onths of 1993 conducting preparation training 
f ir s t  in  W innipeg , a n d  la te r  in  F o rt O rd, 
California. M uch of th is time was spen t working 
the large reserve com plim ent up  to basic regular 
force s ta n d a rd s  for section and  p latoon  battle- 
drills. There w as no tim e to properly exercise 
com pan ies , le t a lone  the  w hole b a tta lio n .6 
B e s id es , s e c tio n  a n d  p la to o n  s k ills  w ere 
generally all th a t is required of soldiers m anning 
observation posts on UN peacekeeping duty. No 
one could know th a t the 2 PPCLI platoons would 
be called upon to gel together and  go into action 
as a full battalion.
2 PPCLI m oved to C roatia  a t the end of 
M arch 1993, replacing 3 PPCLI on w hat Land 
F orces C om m and refe rred  to as  O pera tion  
H arm ony. At th a t tim e, UNPROFOR’s CANBAT 
1 w as responsib le for a UN Protected Area in 
S ecto r West, in  the  n o rth w es te rn  co rn e r of 
Croatia. It w as there  th a t  L ieutenant-C olonel 
J a m e s  C alv in , c o m m a n d in g  th e  2 PPCLI 
B a ttle g ro u p , a n d  h is  tro o p s  d ev e lo p ed  a 
repu ta tion  am ong the w arring parties an d  their 
fellow UN contingents for being fair, b u t tough.
Unlike u n its  from m ost o ther in te rnationa l 
contingents, C anadian  battalions operated with 
its full compliment of war-fighting weaponry and 
equipm ent. Rifle com panies travelled in M -l 13 
Arm oured Personnel Carriers (APCs) configured 
in an  Am erican a rm oured  cavalry fash ion  with 
an  arm oured  cupola offering som e protection 
for crewmen m anning the powerful Browning .50 
ca lib re  m a c h in e -g u n . The c o m p an ies  also  
carried  along w ith them  C-6 m edium  m achine- 
g uns and  84 m m  Carl G ustav  an ti- ta n k  rocket 
launchers to add to platoon weaponry consisting 
of C-7 au tom atic  rifles an d  C-9 light m achine- 
guns.
Rifle com pany firepower w as am plified by 
th e  h eav y  w e a p o n s  of S u p p o r t  C om pany  
in c lu d in g  81m m  m o rta rs  a n d  TOW (Tube-
launched , Optically-tracked, Wire-guided) an ti­
a rm o u r guided m issiles m oun ted  in  arm oured  
tu rre ts aboard purpose-built APCs.7 C anada was 
am ong the first m em ber nations to deploy blue- 
helm eted soldiers w ith  th is  k ind  of firepower 
w hen  UNPROFOR first deployed to C roatia in
1992. This so rt of s tance  w as n o t initially well 
received in UN H eadquarters in New York, where 
the trad itional no tion  of lightly arm ed  blue- 
bere ted  peacekeepers prevailed.8 However, by
1993, the  value of w ell-arm ed forces in  the 
Form er Yugoslavia, w here the consen t of the 
w arring  parties  w as no t always apparen t, was 
well understood .
Once on the  ground, 2 PPCLI earned  their 
tough repu tation  not only with their equipm ent, 
b u t by their dem onstra ted  willingness to u se  it. 
Not long  a fte r  th e ir  a rriv a l, th e  b a tta lio n  
conducted  a  m ajor defensive exercise in the 
sector. The exercise w as in tended  partially  to 
complete the battlegroup’s collective training and 
improve force cohesion, b u t also to dem onstrate 
to the Croats th a t an  attack into the UN Protected 
Area in Sector West would and  could be resisted 
by the UN.
The P atric ia’s vigorously enforced w eapons 
bans in their a rea  of operations, seizing con tra ­
b a n d  a rm s  of all types from  b o th  w arrin g  
fac tio n s . C olonel C alv in  a lso , on h is  own 
initiative, developed a  procedure to deter Croat 
an d  Serb  pa tro lling  a n d  ra id in g  w ith in  the 
Protected Area. Previously, belligerent soldiers 
detained by the UN after engaging in such activity 
would be re tu rn ed  to their own au tho rities  for 
pun ishm en t. Calvin began releasing de ta inee’s 
to the opposing forces w ith UN civilian police 
keeping a close eye to en su re  p u n ish m e n t was 
not “term inal.”9
A fter five m o n th s  of in - th e a tre  tra in in g  
coupled w ith h a n d s  on practice, the 2 PPCLI 
Battlegroup becam e one of the m ost effective and 
respected  u n its  in all of UNPROFOR. It w as for 
th a t reason  th a t the new Force Com m ander, 
French Army General Cot, selected them  to move 
to Sector S ou th  to u n d e rtak e  one of the  m ore 
d if f ic u lt  a s s ig n m e n ts  in  U n ite d  N a tio n s  
peacekeeping history.
Unlike 2 PPCLI’s relatively tranqu il form er 
area  of responsibility , Sector S ou th  w as still a 
w ar zone. It was here th a t C roatian  Serbs m ost 
fiercely re s is te d  the  n o tio n  of living u n d e r  
Z a g re b ’s ru le . C ro a tia n  a n d  S e rb  t ro o p s  
routinely  exchanged sm all arm s, m orta r and  
a rtille ry  fire all over th e  a rea . T his s tead y  
exchange of fire was p u n c tu a te d  in 1993 by 
several m ajor C roatian  offensives, includ ing  
“Operation M aslencia” in January . At Maslencia, 
F rench  troops guard ing  the UN Protected Area 
were forced to abandon  their positions w hen 
faced w ith heavy C roa tian  fire. The F rench  
withdrawal allowed advancing Croatian un its  to 
occupy the  supposed ly  de-m ilitarized buffer 
zone. This event destroyed Serb confidence in 
the force m andated to protect them. It also taught 
the Croatians th a t a few well directed bullets and 
shells would send  the  b lue-helm ets packing  
anytime they wished to remove prying UN eyes.10
Nonetheless, by sum m er of 1993 both  sides 
h a d  b e e n  p r e s s u r e d  by  th e  in te rn a t io n a l  
com m unity into a  new ceasefire in Sector South  
known as the E rdu t Agreement. Under the term s 
of th is  a g re e m e n t, C ro a tia n  fo rces w ould  
w ithdraw  from m any of the territories gained in 
th e  M a s le n c ia  o f fe n s iv e . T he  C a n a d ia n  
battlegroup, reinforced w ith two m echanized 
F rench  com panies b rough t in from  Bosnia and
n o rth e rn  Croatia, w as ordered to en su re  th a t 
C roatia followed th rough  with the agreem ent.
General Cot anticipated that Croatian troops 
would be reluctan t to w ithdraw  from their hard- 
won gains. This is why he chose the well arm ed 
and highly effective CANBAT 1 to im plem ent the 
agreem ent an d  restore UN presence in Sector 
South. Cot expected and  even hoped for trouble 
as he was looking for an  opportunity to win back 
UN credibility lost in J a n u a ry ."  He would get 
h is wish.
While Cot expected trouble, he may not have 
been aware of the extent to which Croatian forces 
u s e d  th e  E r d u t  n e g o t ia t io n s  to  s h ie ld  
p repara tions  for a renew ed offensive in Sector 
South . On 9 Septem ber, as lead UN elem ents 
moved into the village of M edak, the C roatian  
9 th  “Lika Wolves” G uards Brigade com m enced 
its a ssa u lt on the salien t section of front known 
as the M edak Pocket. Intelligence a ssessm en ts  
la te r  in d ica ted  the C roa ts  w ere m ost likely 
a ttem pting  to p u sh  back  the frontline so th a t 
their operational zone h eadquarte rs  in the town 
of Gospic would be out range from Serb gunners 
located in the long narrow  M edak sa lien t.12 They 
m ay also have in tended  to drive a corridor to 
the D alm atian  coast, or draw  a tten tion  away 
from dom estic political controversies back  in 
Zagreb.
The Lika Wolves G uards Brigade were well 
supported  w ith tan k s  and  artillery, including a 
sq u ad ro n  of form er E a s t G erm an Army T -72s 
as well as older model W arsaw Pact arm our. 
However, while the Croat force contained all the 
trapp ings of a m odern  m echanized  arm y, it 
applied its com bat power in  very rud im en tary  
fashion. Artillery was used  to lay down a simple 
creeping barrage while the infantry and a rm our 
advanced w ithout any degree of co-ordination. 
As C roat a rm o u r p u sh ed  down the m ain  road 
along the  valley betw een Gospic and  G racac, a 
C roa t ligh t in fa n try  force o p e ra tin g  in the  
m oun ta in s  to the  so u th  moved to close off the 
M edak Pocket from the opposite direction. The 
even m ore poorly organized and  equipped Serb 
defence collapsed under the crude, b u t effective 
Croat onslaugh t.13
The C roat p re lim in ary  b a rrag e  on Serb  
defences in the  M edak Pocket com m enced as 
lead elem ents of 2 PPCLI were moving up  to the
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front, through the Serb rear area, in preparation 
to implement the E rdu t agreement. The outbreak 
of heavy fighting required  a rapid  and  dram atic 
ad justm en t to C anadian  plans. T rained to react 
quickly to unexpected  developm ents on a fast- 
moving battlefield, the Patricia’s easily m anaged 
the ad justm ent. Forw ard p latoons im m ediately 
com m enced c o n stru c tio n  of fortifications to 
p ro tec t against the  bom bardm ent. The well- 
drilled Patric ia’s took advantage of every lull in 
th e  b a rra g e  to  fu r th e r  s a n d b a g  a n d  reve t 
positions. Over 500 m ortar, field and  m edium  
shells fell in an  a rea  the size of Parliam ent Hill 
a ro u n d  L ieu tenan t Tyrone G reen’s 9 Platoon 
from C harlie C om pany w ith in  the  village of 
M edak itself. This did no t deter G reen an d  his 
m en from carrying out their newly assigned tasks 
of gathering intelligence on the developing battle 
and  recording cease-fire violations. It is a tribute 
to th e ir  h ig h -in te n s ity  w ar figh ting  sk ills , 
including a thorough appreciation of the effects 
of artillery , th a t  only four C a n a d ian s  were 
w ounded during  the shelling .14 If the  C roats 
expected their barrage  on Serb defences would 
also drive off the UN, they were wrong.
Serb reinforcem ents poured  into the M edak 
Pocket from all over Yugoslavia an d  in two days 
m anaged to stop the C roatian advance cold, b u t 
n o t before th e  te n  k ilom etre  long a n d  five 
kilometre wide salient had  been pinched out and 
the front line straightened, roughly 3000 m etres 
northw est of Medak. Fighting raged on in a bitter
sta lem ate  for two m ore days un til Serb artillery 
opened fire on the C roatian city of Karlovac, and 
then  launched  a FROG long range missile into a 
Zagreb su b u rb . Serb reta lia tion  coupled w ith 
g ro w in g  p r e s s u r e  from  th e  in te r n a t io n a l  
com m unity  w as enough to convince P resident 
Tudjm an to abandon the offensive and withdraw 
h is forces to their pre- 9 Septem ber s ta r tlin e .15 
A verbal agreem ent to th a t effect was signed into 
the “Medak Pocket Agreement” on 13 September. 
It w ould  be u p  to th e  re in forced  C an ad ian  
battlegroup  to en su re  all p arties  complied with 
the new  term s.
Up to th is  point, 2 PPCLI had  ju s t  been 
passive -  if d irect -  pa rtic ip an ts  in  the M edak 
Pocket action. However, th a t soon changed. At 
1630 on 14 September, 1993 Lieutenant-Colonel 
Calvin held an  O rders G roup (“O” Group) w ith 
h is subo rd ina te  officers and  NCOs to review 
p la n s  for th e  com ing  o p e ra tio n . T he new  
w ithdraw al agreem ent w as to be im plem ented 
in  four p h a ses . The firs t s tep  of occupying 
S erb ian  frontline positions would be m ade by 2 
PPCLI’s C harlie  C om pany a n d  one F ren ch  
com pany on 15 Septem ber. Phase 2 would see 
Charlie Company, under the watchful eyes of the 
an ti-arm our platoon, estab lish  a crossing point 
in  the  n o -m an ’s-lan d  betw een the opposing 
arm ies on the m ain  paved road  ru n n in g  the 
leng th  of the  valley floor. In p h ase  3, Delta 
Company and the second French Company from 
FREBAT 3 would move along the road, through
S erg ea n t R o d  D earing’s  sec tion  o f  7 p la toon, p o s in g  in fr o n t  o f  their tren ch es the  m orning a fte r  their f ir e fig h t r e q q -c d -049 
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o f  D earing’s  riflem en w ere  reserv ists .
the secure  crossing po in t an d  on to occupy the 
fo rw a rd  C ro a t ia n  p o s i t io n s .  2 P P C L I’s 
R e c o n n a is sa n ce  P la toon  a n d  th e  b a tta lio n  
ta c t ic a l  h e a d q u a r te r s  w o u ld  follow  D e lta  
com pany into the  pocket. The la s t step  would 
be to oversee the C roatian  w ithdraw al to their 
pre-9 S ep tem ber positions thereby  com pleting 
the separa tion  of forces and  estab lish ing  a new  
dem ilitarized zone. The P a tric ia ’s A lpha and  
Bravo Com panies, which only ju s t  arrived in  the 
a re a  from  S e c to r  W est, w ou ld  se c u re  th e  
r e m a in d e r  o f th e  CANBAT 1’s a r e a  of 
r e s p o n s ib i l i ty  d u r in g  th e  o p e ra t io n .  
U nfortunately  the  C anad ians would have to do 
w ithou t its 81 m m  m orta r platoon. Since the 
un it was due to rotate hom e in only a few weeks, 
the tu b es  h a d  already  been  sh ipped  b ack  to 
C anada.16
In the h o u rs  prior to the  operation  G eneral 
Cot personally  flew into the a rea  to speak  to 
C olonel C alv in , e s se n tia l ly  ta k in g  overa ll 
com m and of the  operation  an d  elim inating the 
link to Sector Sou th  H eadquarters in Knin. Too 
m uch  w as rid ing on the com ing events to have 
a n y  d e la y  in  th e  r e p o r t in g  c h a in  o r a n y  
m isu n d ers tan d in g  abou t w hat w as to happen . 
The Force com m ander rem inded  Calvin of how  
vital it was th a t h is battlegroup succeed in order 
to restore UN credibility. Cot also indicated th a t
details of the  M edak Pocket Agreem ent h ad  not 
likely m ade it from Zagreb down to the frontline 
C r o a t ia n  s o ld ie r s  t h a t  w o u ld  be  s o o n  
encountered. General Cot strongly implied th a t 
force m ay have to be u se d  to e n su re  th e ir  
com pliance w ith the agreem ent. He rem inded 
Calvin th a t the UN ru les of engagem ent allowed 
to blue helm eted C anad ian  and  F rench  troops 
to re tu rn  fire in k ind if they or their m andate  
were th re a te n e d .17 The m ission  was clear and  
the stage set.
The M -l 13 A rm oured Personnel C arriers of 
C h a r lie  C o m p a n y  ro lle d  fo rw a rd  o n  15 
Septem ber on schedule. Not long after se tting  
off, L ieu tenan t G reen’s 9 Platoon cam e u n d er 
sm all a rm s an d  m ach ine  g u n  fire from  the  
C roatian lines. At first it appeared  th a t General 
Cot was right about the Croat frontline u n its  not 
being advised th a t the C anad ians were coming. 
The solu tion  to th is problem  seem ed obvious. 
Get the white pa in ted  a rm oured  vehicles ou t in 
the open w here there  would be no m istake th a t 
it was UNPROFOR advancing, ra ther than  a Serb 
counterattack.
Large b lue  UN flags were fixed to radio  
a n te n n a  an d  the carriers driven ou t of a tree 
line into the  open. This b rough t an  increase in 
Croat fire, including heavy m achine gun, rocket
propelled g renades an d  20 m m  an ti-a irc ra ft 
gunfire. It w as now obvious th a t the  C roatians 
h a d  no  in te n tio n  of le ttin g  th e  C a n a d ia n s  
advance. All along the Charlie an d  FREBAT 1 
C om pany front, the  b lue  he lm ets h a lted  in 
w hatever defensive positions they  could find, 
roughly along the form er Serb line. For the next 
15 h o u rs , th e  C ro a tia n s  s h o t  it o u t w ith  
C anad ian  and  F rench  tro o p s .18 Interestingly  
enough, of all the  w eapons u sed  against the 
advancing UN troops, the deadly T -72s know n 
to be in the a rea  did no t m ake an  appearance. 
Perhaps Croat officers were aware of the potency 
of th e  TOW a n t i - a r m o u r  m iss ile  sy s te m , 
especially when m anned by Canadian crews, and 
w ere unw illing  to r isk  th e ir  p re c io u s  new  
vehicles.
It was not exactly a battle, a t least not by the 
standards of w estern arm ies where positions are 
a ttacked  w ith fire and  m ovem ent. There were 
no infantry a ssau lts  or sweeping tan k  th ru s ts  to 
seize g round  held  by the UN. T ha t is no t how 
w ar is waged in the B alkans. G round com bat in 
the  Form er Yugoslavia consisted  of bo th  sides 
a t te m p t in g  to  m a k e  o p p o s in g  p o s i t io n s  
u n ten ab le  by bringing m axim um  fire to bear. 
Conversely, as soon as a position  becam e too 
dangerous due to accurate  and su sta ined  fire, it 
w as abandoned. Any m ovem ent th a t  involved 
placing troops in the open was avoided. Weapons 
w ere p le n tifu l in  th e  reg ion  b u t  so ld ie rs , 
especially of the  tra ined  variety, were not. This 
way of w ar may also be a vestige of Tito’s guerilla 
m ilitary doctrine th a t form ed the b as is  of the 
old Yugoslav N ational Army in w hich m any of 
the officers and  NCOs on both  sides had  served.
The a rg u m e n t th e n  is th a t  by  B a lk a n  
definition, the Croat firefight with C anadian and
F rench  soldiers w as indeed a battle . It surely 
seem ed th a t  way to Sergean t Rod D earing’s 
se c tio n  of 2 PPCLI’s 7 P la toon  on C harlie  
C om pany’s left n ea r the  village of Licki Citluck. 
It w as there th a t some of the heaviest firing took 
place, often a t ranges of 150 metres. At one point 
in  th e  even ing  C ro a t m o rta rs  a n d  20 mm 
au to can n o n s  w ent to work on the C anad ian  
tren ch  line. C roat in fan try  tried repeatedly  to 
flank D earing’s section, b u t each time they were 
driven off by C anad ian  rifle and  m ach ine-gun  
fire directed by a S tarlight telescopic night vision 
sight.19 In the early hours of 16 September, when 
Croat troops m ade one las t a ttem pt to p u sh  out 
the Patricia’s, Private Scott LeBlanc leapt ou t of 
h is trench  blazing away a t the a ttackers w ith his 
b e lt-fe d  C-9 lig h t m a c h in e -g u n . L e b lan c ’s 
audacious act was apparently enough to convince 
the Croats th a t these C anadians were not about 
to give ground and  th a t it was time to pull back.20 
Regardless of how th is action com pares to other 
larger b a ttle s  in  C anad ian  m ilitary h istory, for 
the riflemen of Charlie Company, it was war. Five 
of D earing ’s m en were reserv ists, includ ing  
LeBlanc.
Over on the UNPROFOR right, the F rench 
Com pany w as having b e tte r luck. E ach  of their 
m echanized p latoons w as equipped w ith one 
VAB infantry fighting vehicle m ounting a 20m m  
autocannon in an  arm oured turret. W hen hostile 
fire was returned with this powerful and accurate 
w eapon, Croat troops were less inclined to offer 
resistence.21
The firefights las ted  all n ight and  early into 
the  nex t m orning. D uring  the n igh t Colonel 
J.O.M. “Mike” Maisonneuve, UNPROFOR’s Chief 
O perations Officer, arrived from Zagreb in an  
effort to talk  down the  C roatians. Eventually,
F rench  A rm y  p la to o n s  u n d e r  
C a n a d ia n  co m m a n d  a t M edak  
ro d e  in  V A B  A r m o u r e d  
P ersonnel Carriers. O ne in each  
p la to o n  w a s  a rm ed  w ith  a  20  
m m  a u to c a n n o n  ( s h o w n  
above). T h ese  w ere  u s e d  w ith  
g r e a t  e f f e c t  a g a i n s t  C ro a t  
a tta c k e rs .
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M aisonneuve, Lieutenant-Colonel Calvin, and  a 
senior UN Military O bserver drove down the 
m a in  ro a d  to  m ee t w ith  th e  lo ca l C ro a t 
com m ander. O pera tional Zone C om m ander 
General Ademi, rough equivalent to a NATO 
corps com m ander, agreed to the m eeting and  
let the  C anad ians delegation p a ss  th rough  the 
lines to h is head q u arte rs  in Gospic. After m uch  
h e a ted  d iscussion , Ademi agreed no t re s is t 
phase 2 and  th a t the C anadians could estab lish  
the crossing point th a t  n igh t w ithou t C roatian  
interference. Phase 3 would com m ence a t 1200 
the  following day w hen D elta Com pany would 
p ass  th rough  the crossing  poin t to move into 
the C roatian  trench  line.22 D uring the night, 
M ajor D an  D rew  a n d  h is  D elta  C om pany  
H eadquarters moved up  the road to the crossing 
point. The rem ainder of the com pany would join 
him  in the m orning for the ir 1200 departu re  
time.
The P atric ia’s rose to a horrifying sigh t on 
the m orning of 16 Septem ber. Sm oke could be 
seen rising from several villages behind Croatian 
lines. Explosions an d  an  occasional b u rs t  of 
au to m a tic  rifle fire cou ld  a lso  be h e a rd . It 
su d d e n ly  becam e c lea r w hy th e  C ro a tia n s  
resisted  the C anad ian  advance. Those villages 
were inhab ited  p redom inan tly  by S erbs and  
C roatian  Special Police were no t yet finished 
ethnically cleansing them .
Colonel Calvin c lam oured for action  and  
im m ediately recalled Colonel M aisonneuve to 
m eet again with General Ademi. U nfortunately, 
w ith only four widely separa ted  com panies and  
no suppo rting  tan k s  or artillery, Calvin’s force 
h ad  no chance in  a frontal a ttack  aga in st the 
entire Croatian 9 th  Brigade which had  tanks and 
heavy guns. Even if the C anad ians did have the 
s treng th , it would be far beyond the scope of 
UNPROFOR’s m andate  to deliver a full a ttack . 
R e tu rn in g  a im ed  fire w as  one is s u e , b u t  
launch ing  an  a ssa u lt w as another. There was 
little the  C anad ians could do b u t s it b ack  w ait 
for the 1200 timing. As they waited they listened 
helplessly to the  explosions and  shooting and  
im agined  w h a t w as h a p p e n in g  to th e  Serb  
civilians to their front.
Delta Com pany rolled ahead  on schedule at 
noon m ounted in their M -l 13s and  accompanied 
by several TOW an ti-a rm o u r vehicles. They no 
sooner s ta rte d  down the  road in colum n before
they ra n  in to  a C roatian  roadblock. To the left 
of the  road  sa t a very m odern and  very deadly 
T-72 m ain  battle  tank, a gift from Germany. On 
the righ t side of the road, two towed a n ti- tan k  
guns and  a b ank  of Sagger m issiles were aim ed 
at the C anadian column. A company of Croatian 
infan try  pro tected  by a hastily  laid m ine field 
th a t com pleted the obstacle.
The sen ior C roatian officer on the barrier 
refused Major Drew’s dem and th a t his com pany 
be allowed to pass. W eapons on both sides were 
m ade ready  for action . T his ten se  M exican 
standoff lasted  over an  hour. T hroughout the 
standoff, the well trained and  highly disciplined 
C anad ian  riflem en m ain ta ined  their cool while 
the Croats grew increasingly uneasy. Essentially 
the reso lu te  and  stern-faced  C anad ians began 
to s ta re  dow n the  C ro a tia n s  m a n n in g  th e  
roadblock.23
D uring the  tension, Colonel Calvin arrived 
on the  scene . He a rgued  h ea ted ly  w ith the  
ranking Croat officer, Brigadier General Mezic.24 
Mezic was General Ademi’s senior liaison officer. 
His p resence a t the  road block ind icated  th a t 
th e  O p e ra tio n a l Zone C o m m an d er h a d  no 
in tention of keeping his word. In fact, Mezic was 
stalling  to give C roatian  Special Police the  time 
they  n eed ed  to  d es tro y  ev idence of e th n ic  
cleansing.
Shortly  after 1300, Calvin took a gam ble to 
b reak  the deadlock an d  avoid a bloody point- 
b lank  shoo tou t in the m iddle of the  road. Some 
20 in te rnationa l jo u rn a lis ts  had  accom panied 
Delta Company, all seeking to cover the story of 
the  C ro a tia ’s la te s t invasion  of the  S erb ian  
Krajina. It w as time to b ring  them  into action. 
Calvin called the m edia crews to the front of the 
colum n an d  held a p ress  conference, com plete 
w ith cam eras, in front of the roadblock. He told 
the reporters  w hat C roatian  policem en were 
doing on the o ther side of the barricade and  had  
th e  c a m e ra ’s film  th e  C ro a tia n ’s o b v io u s 
interference w ith the UN’s effort to m ake peace.
The cam eras broke the  increasingly shaky  
Croat resolve. By 1330, Delta Com pany w as on 
the move. Calvin’s imaginative ploy was too late 
to s top  the  e thnic  cleansing of Serb villages in 
the M edak Pocket, b u t it did allow the blue- 
helm ets to reach  m ost of the  villages before all 
traces of C roatian  atrocities could be e rased .25
ill*
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A b o v e  81 le ft:  So ld iers fr o m  2 
PPCLI s u r v e y  b a ttle -d a m a g e d  
b u i ld in g s  a lo n g  th e  l in e  o f  
c o n fr o n ta t io n  in  th e  M e d a k  
Pocket.
Unfortunately, the battlegroup was also held up 
later in the afternoon by senior UN officials who 
in sis ted  th a t they stick  to a rigid tim e table for 
advancing into the  pocket, a tim etable th a t  did 
no t take  into accoun t th a t w ith every w asted  
m inute, more evidence was destroyed. It was not 
un til 17 Septem ber th a t  UNPROFOR soldiers 
occupied the whole area.
The next few days were the m ost difficult for 
C anadian  soldiers involved in the M edak Pocket 
operation. Their job was now, along with civilian
police officers and  UN medical officers, to sweep 
the a rea  for signs of e thnic  cleansing. The task  
w as enorm ous. E ach  an d  every build ing  in the 
M edak Pocket h ad  been  levelled to the  ground. 
T ruck  loads of firewood h ad  been  b rough t to 
s ta r t  in tense fires am ong the wooden buildings. 
Brick an d  concrete build ings were blow ap a rt 
w ith  exp losives a n d  a n ti - ta n k  m in es . The 
C roatians com pleted the ir ta sk  by killing m ost 
of the  livestock in the  area. T hat w as the small- 
a rm s firing heard  on 16 Septem ber. In addition, 
oil or dead an im als were dum ped into wells to
C anad ian  Colonel George O ehring took co m m a n d  o f  UNPROFOR Sector S o u th  su b se q u e n t to M edak. Oehring  
reported  a  s ign ifican t im p ro vem en t to UN credibility  am ong  th e  w arring fa c tio n s  fo llo w in g  the  operation. 
H ere Oehring (centre) ta k e s  th e n  Vice C h ie f o f  th e  D efence S ta ff, V ice-Adm iral Larry M urray (second  fr o m  
right) on  tour in Sector H ea d q u a rters  in Knin.
m ake them  unusab le  for Serbs entertain ing any 
thought of re tu rn . 26
Only 16 Serb bodies were found sca ttered  
in  h id d en  locations. The open  g ro u n d  w as 
littered  w ith ru b b er surgical gloves. Calvin and  
his m en believed the gloves indicated th a t m ost 
Serb dead laying in the  open were tran sp o rted  
elsewhere and  only those h idden  in  b asem en ts  
or in the woods had  been left behind in haste . A 
m ass grave containing over fifty bodies was later 
located in the vicinity. The bodies recovered 
included those of two young wom en found in a 
basem en t. They h ad  apparen tly  been tied up, 
shot and  then  doused with gasoline and burned. 
When found, the bodies were still hot enough to 
m elt p lastic  body bags. At an o th e r location, an  
elderly Serb w om an h ad  been  found sh o t four 
tim es in  the head , execution style.27
While the job of gathering evidence m ay have 
been  the  m ost difficult for th e  C an a d ian s , 
haun ting  m any of the young soldiers to th is day, 
it was of critical im portance. The M edak Pocket 
provided the  world w ith the first h a rd  evidence 
th a t Serbia, although probably the largest, was 
not the sole p e rp e tra to r of e thnic  cleansing  in 
the B alkans. Also, the m eticu lous C anad ian  
p rocedures u sed  to sweep an d  record evidence 
in the area becam e standardized in UNPROFOR, 
perhaps providing some degree of deterrence to 
those who m ay fear being called before a w ar 
crim es tribunal.
Canadian action at Medak earned back some 
of the respect for the U nited N ations lo st a t 
Maslencia. That sam e m onth, a Canadian officer, 
C o lo n e l G eo rg e  O e h r in g , to o k  o v er a s
com m ander of Sector S ou th . O ehring w as in a 
b e tte r position  th a t anyone to feel the effects of 
Medak.
M edak re s to red  UNPROFOR’s credibility  
resulting in renewed dialogue leading to a local 
informal cease-fire in November, a more formal 
and wider one at Christmas, and a “bilateral”, 
universal cease-fire signed in Zagreb on 29 
March, 1994. Everybody hated us in September 
1993. I was stoned and threatened during my 
first trip to Zadar to meet the Croat commander 
there. Medak changed all this. The Serbs, right 
up  to my d e p a rtu re  a year la ter, w ould 
spontaneously mention the resolute fairness of 
the Canadians at Medak, while the Croats, 
although grudgingly at first, came to respect the 
Canadians in Sector South.28
U nfortunately M edak did no t go far enough 
in wiping away the m em ory of M aslencia. The 
C anad ians m ay have docum ented  C roat w ar 
crim es, b u t they could no t stop them , adding to 
the  sen se  of in se c u rity  am ong  the S e rb s .29 
However, J im  Calvin an d  h is m en can  take 
c o m fo rt in  th e  k n o w led g e  t h a t  th e y  d id  
everything w ith in  their m eans to keep order in 
C ro a tia . T he  in te r n a t io n a l  p e a c e k e e p in g  
com m unity w as no t yet ready  in 1993 to take 
the k ind  of reso lu te  s tep s  seen  las t year in 
Kosovo. It w ould take several, m uch  larger 
m assacres around the world before international 
political will could be m ustered  to intervene and  
stop ethnic cleansing.
The jo in t C an ad ian -F ren ch  opera tion  a t 
M e d ak  r e p r e s e n t s  a w a te r s h e d  in  th e  
developm ent of international conflict resolution. 
It will be m any years before scholars will be able 
to fully explain the ongoing transfo rm ation  in
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the  n a tu re  of m odern m ilitary peace su p p o rt 
operations. Sources are not yet available and  not 
enough distance has  been established to present 
a clear, accurate  h istorical picture.
The M edak Pocket O peration also occurred 
a t the beginning of the tran sitio n  period. The 
C anad ian  battlegroup possessed  a high degree 
of com bat power and a dem onstrated willingness 
to use  it. However, m ost o ther con tingen ts in 
UNPROFOR were totally unprepared  in regards 
to equipment, training and political will to engage 
in  th e  ty p es  of a c tio n  c a rr ie d  o u t by the  
C anadians a t Medak.
Analysis of activities engaged in by Canadian 
troops a t M edak offers an  alternative view to the 
conclusions of the  Som alia Report. O perations 
in UNPROFOR’s Sector South  dem anded the full 
range of capabilities possessed  by C anad ian  
s o ld ie rs ,  from  fo r t if ic a tio n  c o n s tru c t io n , 
m arksm anship , and  m echanized mobile com bat 
to negotiation and basic investigation techniques. 
In  all th e se  ca teg o rie s , C a n a d ia n  m ilita ry  
lead ersh ip  a n d  tra in in g  w as of th e  h ig h est 
standard . Contrary to the findings of the Somalia 
Inquiry, the C anad ian  Army in 1993 contained 
d e d ic a te d ,  s k il le d , a n d  w e l l-d is c ip lin e d  
professional soldiers. These troops were led by 
competent, educated, and  highly capable officers 
an d  senior NCOs.
M edak and  Som alia were obviously n o t the 
only two Canadian military operations in tire last 
decade. A great deal more research  is necessary  
before a final verdict can be passed  on Canadian 
Forces effectiveness in the  1990s. One th ing  is 
c lea r, how ever. An in s t i tu t io n  c a p a b le  of 
producing soldiers who could perform effectively 
in the difficult and constantly evolving conditions 
a t M edak w as probably  not as close to collapse 
as som e may th ink. *1
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A pop u la r pho tograph  o f  H M CS  A urora a longside  the q u a y  in E squ im alt, BC, April 1921, w ith  d es tro yers  
Patrician a n d  Patrio t nearby. T he ‘c lo ck’ on  the  control top is the  C h a d b u rn e  V isual R a n g e  Dial, u se d  to signa l 
the  g u n  range to o ther sh ip s  fir in g  on the s a m e  target. The tru n ca ted  fly in g -o ff  p la tfo rm  is visib le a b a ft the  
fo r w a r d  6-inch gun . Tw o 9 fo o t  B arr & S tro u d  co-incidence rangefinders can  be seen , one on the  bridge, the  
other aft.
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